The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement by Donaldson, John E.
College of William & Mary Law School
William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository
Faculty Publications Faculty and Deans
1993
The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal,
Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement
John E. Donaldson
William & Mary Law School
Copyright c 1993 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs
Repository Citation
Donaldson, John E., "The Future of Transfer Taxation: Repeal, Restructuring and Refinement, or Replacement" (1993). Faculty
Publications. Paper 489.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/facpubs/489
THE FUTURE OF TRANSFER TAXATION: REPEAL, 
RESTRUCTURING AND REFINEMENT, OR 
REPLACEMENT 
JOHN E. DONALDSON* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Taxation of gratuitous transfers is a venerable component of the federal 
tax system. We have had an estate tax, 1 which includes within its base 
certain lifetime dispositions testamentary in nature, since 1916. Taxation of 
gifts2 has been a significant component since 1932.3 With a tentative begin-
ning in 1976,4 aborted retroactively and replaced with a substitute in 1986,s 
the estate and gift tax system is now supplemented with a system for taxing 
generation-skipping transfers (GST).6 As a result of reforms enacted in 
1976,7 and later enactments, the system is now largely unified and is, at 
least in a formal sense, coherent. However, the transfer tax system remains 
deficient in a number of ways. The adequacy of the system can be measured 
in terms of whether it accomplishes its objectives. Under this measure, the 
system, apart from raising comparatively insignificant revenue, is a failure. 
Its adequacy can also be measured in terms of the traditional tests of a 
good tax system, which employ standards of efficiency, fairness, and neu-
trality. Under this measure, the system also fails. Concededly, no tax system 
can be expected to be perfect. The extent to which imperfections can be 
reasonably tolerated and accepted is in part a funcHon of the revenues 
produced by the system. The imperfections within a system are costs which 
should be borne only if the revenues generated are adequate to warrant the 
costs. The current system is too costly. It can be improved. However, the 
improvements possible in relation to revenues likely to be generated from 
transfer taxation under the existing system, if implemented, are unlikely to 
make the costs of the system acceptable. The fundamental problem under 
the present system lies in its focus on the transferor, the donor, or decedent 
who is transferring accumulated wealth. The tax is imposed on the transferor 
• Ball Professor of Law, College of William and Mary. 
1. I.R.C. §§ 2001-2056A {1988 & Supp. 1993). 
2. I.R.C. §§ 2501-2524 {1988 & Supp. 1993). 
3. For a history of transfer taxation, see David M. Hudson, Tax Policy and the Federal 
Taxation of the Transfer of Wealth, 19 WILLAMETI'E L.J. 1, 9-32 {1983). 
4. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 {codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
5. Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 {codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U .S.C.). 
6. I.R.C. §§ 2601-2663 {1988 & Supp. 1993). 
7. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 {codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 26 U .S.C.). 
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and is measured by the type and value of wealth transferred, and the extent 
of imposition is determined by reference to the circumstances of the trans-
feror and by exclusions and exemptions accorded the transferor. Such a 
system inherently invites manipulation and avoidance by the transferor and 
penalizes those who are unwary or who fail to pursue avoidance measures. 
The system's inherent invitation to manipulate and its penalties for failure 
to do so cause it to be unfair, inefficient, and nonneutral. 
Whether accumulated wealth is a proper subject of taxation is a matter 
over which economists disagre~8 and is essentially a political question. 
Assuming that wealth transfer or receipt is a proper base for the imposition 
of tax, the question of how much revenue should be derived from such 
base is also a political question. However, the question of whether a 
particular system for taxing accumulated wealth is useful and worthwhile, 
though not devoid of political significance, is essentially a practical and 
utilitarian matter. This essay suggests that as a practical and utilitarian 
matter, the present estate, gift, and generation-skipping tax system should 
be abandoned.9 It acknowledges that the present system can be improved. 
It suggests, however, that the improvements possible are not sufficient to 
warrant retention of the old system. It suggests that if wealth is to be taxed 
upon transfer, two models which focus on the transferee rather than the 
transferor, are likely to .offer more acceptable methods of accomplishing 
that task. One of these models is an accessions tax. The other treats the 
receipt of gifts and bequests as taxable income to the recipient. This essay 
first assesses the adequacy of the existing system in relation to its apparent 
objectives, and then examines the system under the policy measures of 
fairness, efficiency, and neutrality. 10 It concludes with a consideration of 
alternative models for taxing the receipt of wealth. 
8. See generally Mark L. Ascher, Curtailing Inherited Wealth, 89 MrcH. L. REv. 69, 
86-121 (1991). 
9. The suggestion that estate and gift taxes should be repealed is not novel. See Joel 
C. Dobris, A Brief for the Abolition of All Transfer Taxes, 35 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1215 (1984) 
(arguing for repeal of estate tax due to minimal revenue and progressivity effects); Charles 0. 
Galvin, To Bury the Estate Tax, Not to Praise It, 52 TAX NoTEs 1413 (Sept. 16, 1991) 
(suggesting lost revenues be made up through income tax changes); Gerald P. Moran, Estate 
and Gift Taxation: The Case for Repeal, 13 TAX NoTEs 339 (Aug. 17, 1981) (supporting repeal 
of estate and gift taxes because of cost, complexity, distortion in private planning, and failure 
of system to achieve its purposes); Robert B. Smith, Burying the Estate Tax without Resur-
recting its Problems, 55 TAX NOTES 1799 (June 29, 1992) (faulting Galvin's suggested income 
tax changes and presenting alternatives). These commentators generally fault the present system 
for inadequate revenues and lack of fairness, efficiency, and neutrality. Others discuss the 
inadequacy of the present system in the context of suggested alternatives, including an accessions 
tax and the inclusion of donative receipts in the income tax base. See sources cited infra note 
135. Significantly, Australia and Canada have abolished their transfer tax systems. See Willard 
H. Pedrick, Oh to Die Down Under! Abolition of Death and Gift Duties in Australia, 35 TAX 
LAw. 113 (1981); Carter, Federal Abandonment of the Estate Tax: The Intergovernmental 
Fiscal Dimension, 21 CANADIAN TAX J. 232 (1973). 
10. For a discussion of the ideals of fairness, efficiency, and neutrality, see Stanley S. 
Surrey & Gerald M. Brannon, Simplification and Equity as Goals of Tax Policy, 9 WM. & 
MARY L. REv. 915 {1968). 
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• 
II. GoALS oF THE TRANSFER TAX SYSTEM 
Several goals have, from time to time, been ascribed to the transfer tax 
system. One that has been articulated from time to time, particularly during 
the 1930s, is the breaking up or reducing of concentrations of wealth. 11 
Another is that of producing revenue.JZ More recently, the system has been 
"justified" for its role or potential in adding an element of progressivity 
to the overall federal tax system.13 An examination of the transfer tax 
system in relation to these perceived goals is in order. 
A. Reducing Concentrations of Wealth 
However worthwhile the objective of breaking up or reducing concen-
trations of wealth may be, commentators generally agree that the transfer 
tax system has been ineffective in this regard. A study in 1978 concluded 
that transfer tax revenues were so small in relation to the wealth possessed 
by the top .5 percent of the population that the system could not have had 
a significant effect on wealth redistribution. 14 Another commentator writing 
in 1983 concluded that transfer taxes have done little to reduce concentra-
tions of wealth. 15 Notwithstanding occasional expressions to the contrary,I6 
Congress has shown little interest in the role of transfer taxes in breaking 
up concentrations of wealth. Its actions move in the opposite direction. In 
the Tax Reform Act of 197617 Congress, in enacting the reforms resulting 
in unification of the estate and gift tax systems and reduction in the number 
of persons affected, knowingly reduced revenues from transfer taxes. It did 
so again in the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981 18 when it expanded 
the unified credit, 19 thus exempting gratuitous transfers under $600,000 from 
tax, permitted an unlimited marital deduction,20 and revised the rate structure 
to phase in a reduction of the maximum rate bracket from seventy percent 
to fifty percent. 21 Congress did, however, restore a small element of pro-
11. Louis Eisenstein, The Rise and Decline of the Estate Tax, 11 TAX L. REv. 223, 235-
36 (1956). 
12. Id. at 231. 
13. Michael J. Graetz, To Praise the Estate Tax, Not to Bury It, 93 YALE L.J. 259 
(1983). 
14. G. P. Verbit, Do Estate and Gift Taxes Affect Wealth Distribution?, 117 TR. & 
EsT. 598, 604 (1978) (constituting part one of two-part article). 
15. Graetz, supra note 13, at 271. 
16. S. REP. No. 144, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 124 (1981), reprinted in 1981 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
105, 226 (stating that breaking up concentrations of wealth remains a goal of transfer tax 
system). 
17. Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
18. Pub. L. No. 97-34, 95 Stat. 172 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 
U.S.C.). 
19. I.R.C. §§ 2010, 2505 (Supp. 1993). The credit, as phased in, offsets the tax on the 
first $600,000 of donative transfers. 
20. I.R.C. §§ 2056, 2523 (Supp. 1993). 
21. I.R.C. § 2001 (Supp. 1993). 
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gressivity to the system in 198822 by phasing out the benefit of the graduated 
structure for estates over $10,000,000.23 
It is clear that for political reasons or otherwise, Congress has little 
interest in using transfer taxes as an instrument to reduce concentrations of 
wealth. Joseph Peckman of the Brookings Institute was probably correct in 
his observation that "the public does not appear to accept the desirability 
of a vigorous estate and gift tax system."24 Professor Graetz, in likewise 
concluding that the people "do not seem to like heavy taxes on bequests" 
pointed to the poor reception given to George McGovern's proposal to 
heavily tax inheritances above a certain amount and to a California initiative 
to repeal that state's inheritance tax.25 He concluded that sixty-four percent 
of California voters must believe that they will be among the wealthiest five 
to ten percent of the population at death. 26 
The transfer tax system simply has not made a significant contribution 
to a goal of breaking up wealth concentration. Although in 1992 transfer 
taxes produced revenues of approximately $12 billion from the wealthiest 
one percent of the population, 27 that amount is relatively minuscule in 
relation to the objective. 28 Absent a significant change in the political climate, 
which appears unlikely in the foreseeable future, it is improbable that the 
system will be called upon to more effectively address perceived problems 
of wealth concentration. 
B. Production of Revenue 
The second, and perhaps the historically more important goal of the 
transfer tax system, is that of producing revenue.29 In the mid to late 1930s, 
the transfer tax system was a major component of the federal tax system, 
producing more than six percent of total revenues and in one year, 1936, 
ten percent.30 Significantly, in 1934 transfer tax receipts were twenty-seven 
percent of individual income tax receipts.31 In 1936, the $379 million 
produced in transfer taxes amounted to more than fifty-six percent of the 
$674 million produced by the individual income tax.32 Since World War II, 
however, transfer tax revenues have rarely exceeded two percent of total 
22. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 
3342 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
23. I.R.C. 2001(b)(3). 
24. J. PECKMAN, FEDERAL TAX POLICY 255 (5th ed. 1987). 
25. Graetz, supra note 13, at 285. 
26. Jd. at 285. 
27. COMMERCE DEP'T, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 316 (1992) [here-
inafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. 
28. Alicia H. Munnell, Wealth Transfer Taxation: The Relative Role for Estate and 
Income Taxes, NEw ENG. EcoN. REv., Nov.-Dec. 1988, at 6. 
29. Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 231. 
30. Id. at 239. 
31. Id. at 240. 
32. Jd. 
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federal tax collections and as a result of recent changes, have diminished 
to approximately 1.1 percent. 33 This decline reflects the greater importance 
of other taxes to the federal fisc. A comparison of the $12 billion in transfer 
tax receipts budgeted for fiscal 1992 with the $479 billion34 budgeted for 
individual income tax receipts reveals a ratio of transfer tax revenues to 
individual income tax revenues of only 2.5 percent. In terms of revenue 
significance, transfer taxes have evolved from a role of major importance 
to that of virtually a de minimis component. In 1992, revenues from alcohol 
and tobacco taxes exceeded those from transfer taxes by more than $1 
billion.35 
Even if there were greater desire to use the transfer tax system as a 
source of revenue, it is doubtful whether such taxes could be adapted to 
become a major revenue source. In fact, no country, including those which 
have more socialistic political values, derives significant revenues from 
wealth transfer taxation.36 A commentator writing in 1983 observed that 
decedents transfer annually approximately $120 billion in net assets and that 
an effective transfer tax rate of twenty percent applied to that base would 
have produced only $24 billion, about three times the transfer tax revenues 
for that year .37 The actual transfer tax base is much narrower and it would 
be politically difficult to use a larger base. The political factors that 
discourage Congress from using transfer taxes to· reduce concentrations of 
wealth also operate to discourage use of transfer taxes as sources of 
additional revenue. 
Although the $12 billion now produced annually by the transfer tax 
system is but a minuscule part of total federal revenues, it is a significant 
amount in the context of a federal fisc operating with inadequate revenues 
and large deficits. Assuming that these revenue dollars are too important 
to give up, and the class of wealthy on whom the burden falls should be 
largely unchanged, it is fair to ask whether the burden can be imposed 
more fairly and efficiently. 
C. Contributing to Progressivity 
A third goal, or role, of transfer taxes advanced by some is that of 
contributing to the progressivity of the federal tax system. 38 However, that 
role has a more historic than continuing significance and is a function both 
of the progessivity of other taxes, particularly the individual income tax, in 
relation to the amount of transfer tax revenues, and the number of persons 
33. STATISTICAL ABsTRACT, supra note 27, at 316. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Henry J. Aaron & Alicia H. Munnell, Reassessing the Role for Wealth Transfer 
Taxes, 45 NAT'L TAX J. 121, 133 (1992). 
37. Graetz, supra note 13, at 269. 
38. Id. at 271. See also Harry L. Gutman, Reforming Federal Wealth Transfer Taxes 
after ERTA, 69 VA. L. REv. 1183, 1185 (1983) (arguing transfer taxes have "traditionally 
played, and should continue to play, an important role in contributing to the progressivity of 
the tax system as a whole"). 
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burdened by the tax. In the mid to late 1930s, when estate tax revenues on 
occasion were as high as twenty-seven percent to fifty-six percent of indi-
vidual income tax revenues, the transfer tax contributions to the goal of 
progressivity were substantial. Analysis of data for the early 1970s led one 
commentator to conclude that transfer taxes contributed a third as much 
to progressivity of the tax structure as did rates in excess of the average 
effective income tax rate.39 However, the transfer tax contribution to pro-
gressivity had dropped to twelve percent by 1980,40 and would have been 
down to four percent for 1981 if the 1981 legislation had been fully effective 
in that year. 41 When transfer taxes affect the top six or seven percent of 
the population, as they did in the mid-1970s,42 their contribution to pro-
gressivity may have meaningful significance. However, when the affected 
population drops to approximately one percent,43 today's level, the role of 
transfer taxes in contributing to progressivity of the tax system is minuscule. 
The existing transfer tax system simply cannot be justified by reference 
to its contribution to progressivity. Professor Graetz, commenting on the 
narrowing of the transfer tax base effected by the 1981 legislation, which 
was predicated on the "myth" that the proper function of the estate tax is 
to reduce concentrations of wealth in excess of $600,000, bemoaned that 
acceptance of the "myth" defeats the contribution of transfer taxes to 
progressivity. 44 Professor Gutman, also a proponent of the role of transfer 
taxes in contributing to progressivity, refers to the 1981legislation narrowing 
the transfer tax base as "emasculating" transfer taxation as an effective 
component of the tax system. 45 Absent a congressional resolve to reverse 
the direction of the 1981 legislation and to expand the scope of transfer 
taxes by reducing the exemption level and increasing the effective progres-
sivity of the transfer tax rate structure, the existing estate and gift tax 
system has no meaningful role as a contributor to progressivity. The prospect 
of such changes is remote and even proponents of the progressivity role of 
transfer taxation are pessimistic that restoration of such a role is politically 
possible. 46 
Manifestly, current wealth transfer taxation can not be justified by 
perceived roles either of breaking up or reducing concentrations of wealth 
or of contributing to the progressivity of the federal revenue system. If 
these roles are dismissed, a case can be made for repeal of the estate, gift 
tax, and generation skipping taxes,47 notwithstanding that they do produce 
$12 billion in revenue. This revenue, comparatively insignificant, comes at 
39. Graetz, supra note 13, at 272. 
40. /d. 
41. Gutman, supra note 38, at 1195-96. 
42. Munell, supra note 28. 
43. /d. 
44. Graetz, supra note 13, at 271. 
45. Gutman, supra note 38, at 1271. 
46. Graetz, supra note 13, at 284-86. 
47. See id. at 271; sources cited supra note 9. 
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the expense of a "bad" tax system, one that lacks fairness, efficiency, and 
neutrality. 
III. FAIRNESS, EFFICIENCY, AND NEUTRALITY 
Adherence to generally accepted principles of sound tax policy requires 
that tax systems be fair, efficient; and neutral.48 The existing transfer tax 
system severely violates each of these principles. 
A. Fairness 
First, the system is not fair, from considerations of both horizontal 
equity and vertical equity. Horizontal equity suggests that persons transfer-
ring equal wealth within the system be taxed in the same manner. Vertical 
equity (progressivity) suggests that persons of greater wealth be taxed more 
heavily on their transfers than persons of lesser wealth. Substantial hori-
zontal inequity has been legislated into the system. For example, qualifying 
wealth represented by land used in farming and certain other business 
activities may be valued at "use" value rather than fair market value, 
permitting reductions in taxable estates of up to $750,000.49 Also, while 
some employment generated post-death payments are within the transfer 
tax base, 50 others are not. 51 Further, life insurance proceeds, where the 
decedent has an incident of ownership, are included in the estate tax base. 
However, proceeds of life insurance, even when attributable to investment 
made by decedents, are excluded from the base where incidents of ownership 
are lacking, 52 or if once possessed, have been yielded more than three years 
prior to death. 53 
More important to considerations of both horizontal and vertical equity 
is the simple fact that where transfer taxes that would otherwise have been 
imposed are avoided or postponed without penalty, equity is violated. A 
major industry, that pursued by estate planning professionals, has evolved 
to exploit opportunities for avoidance and penalty-free postponement of 
transfer taxes that would otherwise have been payable. A large number of 
attorneys, accountants, financial advisors, insurance specialists, and trust 
officers, having mastered the complexities and intricacies of the transfer tax 
system, devote all or substantial portions of their professional time in service 
of the cause of undermining horizontal and vertical equity within the transfer 
tax system. 
48. Surrey & Brannon, supra note 10. 
49. I.R.C. § 2032A (Supp. 1993). 
50. I.R.C. § 2039 (1988) (including value of annuities in gross estate). 
51. For I.R.C. § 2039 to apply to an employment generated post-death benefit, the 
decedent must have possessed a right to an annuity or other payment. Where the decedent 
lacks such right, and the right to designate the payee, post-death payments escape estate 
taxation. Estate of Fusz v. Commissioner, 46 T.C. 214 (1966), acq., 1967-2 C.B. 1 & 1967-2 
C.B. 2. 
52. I.R.C. § 2042 (1988). 
53. I.R.C. § 2035 (1988). 
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A discussion of all of the tax avoidance and postponement devices 
available to avoid or delay imposition of transfer taxes is beyond the scope 
of this essay.54 The literature on estate planning directed to tax avoidance 
and minimization is extensive. ss To make the point, however, a mention of 
several techniques is sufficient. For example, persons having the greatest 
wealth, and thus benefitting most in circumventing vertical equity, are more 
readily able than those having less wealth to utilize the gift tax system, with 
its "tax exclusive"56 base to reduce the cost of donative transfers. For 
example, a person who has $10,000,000 of wealth can, while living, more 
readily transfer $600,000 in assets considered likely to appreciate in value, 
using the unified credit to avoid immediate imposition of tax, than can an 
one who has only $1,500,000 in wealth. Also, and for convenience, disre-
garding the unified credit, persons who would otherwise be in the fifty-
percent bracket for both immediate gift tax purposes and for eventual estate 
tax purposes can choose to make a gift of $1,000,000, at a gift tax cost of 
$500,000 for total transfer related cost (gift plus gift tax) of $1,500,000. If 
the "fund" of $1,500,000 tapped in giving $1,000,000 to the donee had 
been retained until death and taxed at the fifty-percent bracket, only 
$750,000 would remain after tax to pass to objects of bounty. In this 
example, the transfer tax saving obtained by using a gift mechanism rather 
than a testamentary mechanis91 to pass wealth is $250,000. Another impor-
tant device for avoiding imposition of transfer taxes is the utilization of the 
annual exclusion57 of $10,000 ($20,000 if husband and wife cooperate by 
using the split-gift election). 58 For example, an individual with three married 
children and five grandchildren can annually transfer $10,000 to each child, 
each child's spouse and each grandchild, totalling $110,000 per year, eroding 
the transfer tax base by that amount and avoiding the imposition of as 
much of $55,000 (assuming a potential bracket of fifty percent) for each 
year of such activity. The amounts can be doubled in the case of a married 
couple. Trust arrangements where beneficiaries, including those with con-
54. An especially notable study of transfer tax avoidance, drawn in large measure from 
practices reported by professionals in the field, is George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New 
Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax Avoidance, 77 CoLUM. L. REv. 161 (1977). Several 
of the techniques Professor Cooper discusses, including estate freezing recapitalizations and 
use of charitable lead trusts, have been curtailed by subsequent legislation. 
55. There are a number of journals, monthly and quarterly, devoted to the subject of 
estate planning. Practicing Law Institute annually publishes a significant number of paper 
back books addressing specialized estate planning issues and topics. The University of Miami 
sponsors the annual week-long Heckerling Institute on Estate Planning, the proceedings of 
which are published, and which draws the leading specialists in the field. ALI-ABA and other 
sponsors offer hundreds of continuing legal education courses on the subject, usually utilizing 
detailed outlines developing the topics presented. 
56. Unlike the estate tax, which is "tax inclusive" in its base and allows no deduction 
for tax in measuring the tax, the gift tax is "tax exclusive" and gift taxes payable on a transfer 
are not included in the measure of the tax. Compare I.R.C. § 2001 with § 2501 (Supp. 1993). 
57. I.R.C. § 2503 (Supp. 1993) (providing $10,000 per donor per year exclusion from 
"taxable gifts"). 
58. I.R.C. § 2513 (1988). 
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tingent interests, are given withdrawal powers are available to inflate the 
number of annual exclusions available. 59 
A more sophisticated technique involves the use of grantor retained 
income trusts (GRITS) structured as grantor retained annuity trusts (GRATS) 
or unitrusts (GRUTS) in compliance with applicable limitations.60 Under 
this device a wealthy grantor creates a trust for a term likely to be shorter 
than his remaining life expectancy, retaining a qualifying income interest 
and giving the remainder to the donee. The remainder is valued for gift tax 
purposes at its discounted value,61 which, depending upon the term of the 
trust and the annual payout specified, can be reduced to almost a de minimis 
amount. Typically the arrangement is structured to use the available unified 
credit to offset any gift tax otherwise payable. 62 If the grantor lives out his 
life expectancy and the remainder thus vests in possession while the grantor 
is living, the corpus passes to the remainderman with no additional transfer 
tax exposure. 63 Even if the grantor dies before the end of the trust term, 
there is no down-side risk. In that event the corpus is included in the gross 
estate, which would have been the result if the trust had not been created, 
and the adjustment for lifetime gifts includible in the gross estate assures 
no adverse treatment. 64 
Even more sophisticated techniques are available within the parameters 
of the generation-skipping trust provisions. The GST system actually invites 
the wealthy to structure transfers in a way that avoids the imposition of its 
tax on aggregate transfers of $1,000,000 ($2,000,000 in the case of a married 
couple)65 directly or remotely to grandchildren. Effective use of this ploy 
requires careful navigation through the intricacies of the system and often 
the use of multiple trust devices, reverse Qualified Terminable Interest 
Property (QTIP) elections, 66 complex fund flow mechanisms and tax allo-
cation clauses. 67 The system also inflicts severe penalties in the form of 
otherwise avoidable taxes where multiple-generation trust mechanisms are 
59. Estate of Cristofani v. Commissioner, 97 T.C. 74 (1991), acq. in result in part, 1992-
1 C.B. 1 {allowing annual exclusions for contingent beneficiaries (grandchildren) having lapsing 
withdrawal rights, and thus considered to possess "present" interests with meaning of I.R.C. 
§ 2503). The treatment of lapsing withdrawal powers as present interests was approved in 
Crummey v. Commissioner, 397 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1968). 
60. I.R.C. § 2702 (Supp. 1993). Generally, the retained income interest must be in the 
form of a right to receive a fixed dollar amount or a fixed percentage of corpus valued 
annually. Id. 
61. I.R.C. § 2702. 
62. A gift of a remainder interest in a trust corpus of several million can be discounted 
under "time value of money" methods to reduce the value of the remainder to under $600,000, 
and the unified credit available under I.R.C. § 2010 may be available to defray the applicable 
gift tax. 
63. I.R.C. § 2036 (Supp. 1993). 
64. I.R.C. § 2001(b) (Supp. 1993). 
65. I.R.C. § 2631 (1988). 
66. I.R.C. § 2652(a)(3) (1988). 
67. See generally Edward C. Halbach, Jr., Living with the Generation-Skipping Transfer 
Tax, 22 U. MIAMI INST. EsT. PLAN. 1 906.2 (1988). 
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used by the uninformed or ill-advised. For example, the failure, in an 
appropriate case, to give a child a general power of appointment under a 
multiple-generation trust arrangement can result in significantly higher taxes 
at the death of the child, if the child would otherwise have an under-utilized 
unified credit or would otherwise be in a tax bracket lower than the GST 
bracket, which is fixed at the highest estate tax bracket. 68 
A corollary to the foregoing observations regarding ease of tax avoidance 
and its effect on horizontal and vertical equity is the resulting consequence 
that to a significant extent transfer taxes are "voluntary taxes, " 69 paid 
largely by wealthy persons who are uninformed or ill-advised, or who simply 
die before putting their affairs in order-all too frequent occurrences. To 
the extent that the tax burdens those who bear it only because of the want 
of effective avoidance planning, it is especially unfair. Married couples who 
lovingly put substantially all their assets into tenancies by the entirety and 
other forms of joint and survivor ownership as well as spouses who 
inadvertently permit the bulk of their assets to be titled in the name of one 
often forfeit the effective use of an otherwise available unified credit70 under 
which up to $600,000 could be passed tax free to or for the benefit of 
children on the death of the first to die. In other instances, taxes are 
needlessly or prematurely imposed simply when more effective use of the 
marital deduction technique could have avoided or delayed the imposition 
of tax. 71 Similarly, lack of information or advice regarding opportunities to 
avoid or minimize taxes through lifetime giving arrangements causes im-
position of otherwise avoidable taxes. A tax that is unduly borne by those 
who lack diligence and are uninformed or ill-advised, and is readily avoided 
by those who are diligent, well-informed and advised, is inherently an unfair 
tax. 
B. Efficiency 
Second, the transfer tax is inefficient. This is perhaps the system's most 
serious shortcoming. It requires an inordinate amount of attention at the 
highest levels of government,72 especially in relation to the relative insignif-
icance of the revenues generated. Consider, for example, the obvious enor-
mous efforts of the Treasury and Congress recently expended in dealing 
with valuation issues involved in estate-freezing recapitalizations and related 
techniques. These resulted first in the enactment73 of a largely incompre-
hensible and unacceptable provision, the notorious section 2036(c), second 
68. I.R.C. §§ 2601, 2641 (1988). 
69. Cooper, supra note 54, passim. 
70. I.R.C. § 2010. 
71. When potentially taxable wealth in an estate exceeds the exemption equivalent 
($600,000) of the unified credit, it is generally desirable to leave the excess amount to the 
surviving spouse, which delays imposition of tax, if any, until the death of such spouse. 
72. Hudson, supra note 3, at 32. 
73. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987, Pub. L. 100-203, 101 Stat. 1330 (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
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in the attempt to make it workable by later amendment,74 and then in its 
ultimate repeal and replacement75 by Chapter 14 of the Internal Revenue 
Code. 76 The creativity of estate planning professionals imposes a continuing 
drain on the attention of policy makers and legislators. The tax is compar-
atively expensive to administer. The system's complexity, coupled with the 
creative devices employed in estate planning, requires the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS) to employ lawyers as estate tax examiners, who are compen-
sated at a higher level than other IRS compliance personnel. While only a 
small fraction of individual income tax returns are examined, 12,000 of the 
56,000 estate tax returns filed in 1989 were examined. 77 
Efficiency is not properly measured by compliance costs to the govern-
ment alone. The transfer tax system imposes enormous resource and op-
portunity costs in taxpayer compliance and avoidance endeavors and in the 
time and energy of lawyers, accountants, trust officers, and financial plan-
ners required to understand and apply the system. The magnitude of human 
resources involved is partially suggested by the American Bar Association's 
estimate that over 16,000 lawyers consider trust, probate, and estate law as 
their area of concentration.78 Lawyers, in drafting will and ·trust \arrange-
ments, understandably want their documents to stand the test of time. 
Because of the transfer tax system's focus on the circumstances of the 
decedent, wills for many are typically drafted not only in relation to existing 
circumstances and wealth patterns but in relation to possible changes. 
Lawyers may not cavalierly assume that clients of modest wealth when wills 
are executed will not have substantial wealth at death. Many clients who 
will, in fact, not have transfer tax exposure, receive legal services predicated 
on the possibility that they may face such exposure. Standard "sweetheart" 
wills leaving everything to a surviving spouse typically include disclaimer 
clauses with disclaimer amount trust provisions designed to offer the option 
of a formula-driven "by-pass" trust79 benefitting the spouse, if later needed 
to minimize transfer taxes. Standard wills typically include such boiler plate 
as tax apportionment clauses and tax election clauses, and durable powers 
of attorney instruments increasingly empower the attorney-in-fact to make 
gifts to enable "death bed" use of annual exclusions. Given the possibility, 
although nonlikelihood, that clients will face estate tax exposure, these 
provisions are prudent, even though in reality generally not necessary. 
Although the transfer tax system is intended to affect only a very small 
74. Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, § 3031, 26 U.S.C. § 2036(c) 
(1988). 
75. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388 
(1990). 
76. I.R.C. §§ 2701-2704 (Supp. 1993). 
77. STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 27, at 325. 
78. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 36, at 138. 
79. Such a trust typically is funded in an amount equal to the exemption equivalent (as 
high as $600,000) of the unified credit, and benefits the surviving spouse for life, but does 
not result in inclusion in the taxable estate of the surviving spouse. 
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portion of the population, such protective drafting causes the system to 
affect a substantially larger segment, who prudently, but often unnecessarily, 
receive and pay for complex estate planning services. The system causes 
dispositive arrangements which could and should be simple to be exceedingly 
complex. Understandably, testators want to know the meaning of the 
language used in effecting their dispositive schemes. All too often the tax-
driven complexity of language employed is incomprehensible to the testator. 
The transfer tax system generates other resource and opportunity costs. 
Hundreds of law professors devote substantial portions of their careers in 
exposing thousands of students annually to the challenges and intricacies of 
transfer taxation80 arid the related subject of estate planning, a major 
component of which is a study of techniques to avoid or minimize imposition 
of tax. Similar talent is devoted to the education of accountants, insurance 
agents, financial planners and others. Considerable resources are devoted 
to the presentation of continuing education courses for estate planning 
professionals and to the publication of articles, journals, and books81 devoted 
to their needs in understanding and applying the transfer tax system. 
There are important consequential costs as well. Prudent fiduciaries are 
reluctant to distribute and settle decedents' estates before potential estate 
tax controversies have been settled. The transfer tax system prolongs the 
administration of estates. Prudent fiduciaries invest conservatively, and 
prolonged administration delays access to capital by beneficiaries, who may 
employ it more effectively within the economy. The system also promotes 
the "trustification"82 of assets that might otherwise have been transferred 
outright. 
All of the foregoing energy, resources, and opportunity costs are sac-
rificed on the alter of a tax system that fails to achieve its supposed goals 
and yields only $12 billion in revenue. A recent study concluded that 
resources spent in avoiding transfer taxes are of the same magnitude as the 
revenue produced. 83 The transfer tax system is manifestly inefficient. The 
resource and opportunity costs generated in relation to revenues obtained 
are alone sufficient to make the system unacceptable. 
C. Neutrality 
In addition to the standards of fairness and efficiency used to measure 
the desirability of tax systems is a third, that of neutrality. A good tax 
80. Professor Bittker wrote to the effect that the reason for studying transfer taxes is 
not their significance for tax purposes, but their "power to stimulate and challenge the 
student." See Eisenstein, supra note 11, at 239 (quoting BITTKER, EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION-
CASES AND MATERIALS v (1951)). One may reasonably ask whether comparable stimulation and 
challenge from the study of other subject matter may be more productive and useful. 
81. See sources cited supra note 55. 
82. See Dobris, supra note 9 at 1223; Edward J. Gac & Sharen K. Brougham, A Proposal 
for Restructuring the Taxation of Wealth Transfers: Tax Reform Redux?, 5 AKRoN TAX J. 
75, 82 (1988). 
83. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 36, at 139. 
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system should be neutral in that it ought to be nonintrusive-it should not 
alter choices and behavior that would have occurred in the absence of the 
system. The current tax system is decidedly nonneutral and intrusive. The 
system encourages lifetime gifts and penalizes the failure to make them. 
Further, the system virtually compels use of the marital deduction in most 
cases involving wealthy married couples. In those instances, it thus dis-
courages substantial outright bequests to others. Also, the system discourages 
heavy use of joint and survivor arrangements that might otherwise be useful 
and desirable probate avoidance mechanisms. While the transfer tax system 
discourages substantial bequests to grandchildren and great grandchildren, 84 
it encourages limited bequests to, and certain trust arrangements of limited 
amounts for the benefit of, grandchildren. 85 The system encourages certain 
trust arrangements for the benefit or charity and discourages all other trust 
arrangements for charity.86 Moreover, the system encourages the retention 
of farm and other land in some cases, and discourages the disposition of 
that land by surviving family members in those same cases.87 The system 
discourages certain employment related post-death benefit arrangements and 
encourages others. 88 Jn varying circumstances the transfer tax system may 
encourage or discourage use of trust arrangements involving general or 
special powers of appointment. 89 In inducing the making of gifts for minors 
and others considered unsuitable for the management of property, the system 
encourages the use of trusts. Given the tendency of most spouses to leave 
property to each other to the exclusion of children until the death of the 
surviving spouse, the system encourages the use of "by-pass" trusts. Because 
life insurance is a form of wealth that is fully realized at the death of the 
insured, and because life insurance arrangements can be structured to avoid 
imposition of transfer taxes, even when funded by the insured, the system 
encourages investment in life insurance products.90 The transfer tax system 
discourages the acquisition and retention of life insurance where the insured 
retains ownership incidents over the policy.91 Further, the system strongly 
84. I.R.C. § 2601. 
85. I.R.C. § 2631. 
86. I.R.C. §§ 2055, 2522 (1988). 
87. I.R.C. § 2032A. 
88. I.R.C. § 2039. 
89. This is particularly true in marital dispositions, where the surviving spouse, as to a 
"by-pass" trust, is often given a special power of appointment that avoids taxation on the 
spouse's death, but is given a general power when necessary or appropriate to qualify a trust 
arrangement for the marital deduction permitted for qualified terminable interests. It is also 
true in generation-skipping trust arrangements where the exempt portions are typically subject 
to special powers of appointment and remaining trust vehicles are subject to general powers 
so as to avoid imposition of generation-skipping tax on the death of the holder-beneficiary. 
See I.R.C. § 2041 (1988) (defining general (taxable) power of appointment). 
90. Unless the proceeds are payable to the estate of the insured, or the insured possesses 
incidents of ownership over the policy, proceeds of life insurance generally escape taxation at 
the death of the insured under I.R.C. § 2042. 
91. Jd. 
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encourages the obtaining of professional estate planning advice. The system 
discourages and renders difficult the prompt settlement of decedents' estates. 
On balance, the system contributes heavily to the "trustification" of wealth 
and thus channels the flow of substantial capital into arrangements where, 
given the prudence of fiduciaries, capital is conservatively invested. Thus to 
a substantial degree, the system operates to prevent people from making 
desired dispositions of their property and encourages undesired dispositions. 
The transfer tax system forces use of complex dispositive mechanisms when 
simple arrangements are desired. The system is severely intrusive in affecting 
human choices, investment decisions, and dispositive arrangements. In pe-
nalizing and rewarding different choices and decisions, it restricts investment 
decisions and donative and testamentary freedom and compromises personal 
liberty. Consequently, the transfer tax system is decidedly nonneutral. 
D. Summary of Deficiencies 
To summarize the foregoing analysis of the current transfer tax system, 
it fails in contributing meaningfully to breaking up concentrations of wealth 
or in contributing a meaningful element of progressivity to the federal tax 
system. The revenue that the transfer tax produces is comparatively insig-
nificant, particularly when examined in terms of the imperfections of the 
system used to produce it. The system is unfair and grossly inefficient. 
Rather than being neutral, it is unacceptably intrusive in affecting investment 
decisions, donative and testamentary choices, forms of ownership, forms of 
dispositive arrangements, and post-transfer management of capital, and in 
burdening the probate process and forcing resort to expensive tax avoidance 
advice. The costs of compliance and related monetary and human resources 
consumed in the estate planning and related endeavors associated with 
efforts to comply with the system and avoid or reduce transfer taxes are 
unacceptably high in relation to revenues produced. 
Some of the deficiencies involving horizontal and vertical equity within 
the system admit of legislative correction. Proposals for improvement are 
discussed in the next section. However, such limited correction is unlikely 
to make the system acceptable under standards of efficiency and neutrality. 
If the transfer tax system was reconfigured to produce substantially increased 
revenues, its inefficiency and lack of neutrality would become more toler-
abie, particularly if value is placed on any resulting contribution to pro-
gressivity. Such reconfiguration is a political unlikelihood. Accordingly, 
Congress should repeal the .existing estate and gift tax system. 
IV. RESTRUCTURE AND REFINEMENT 
If however, the choice is one of retaining the present system, Congress 
may be expected eventually to address a number of proposals to restructure 
and refine the system. Even if all or most were adopted, the effect on 
deficiencies noted above would be largely cosmetic. The more important of 
those which appear to have a reasonable chance of serious consideration 
are discussed below. 
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The Treasury Department in its 1984 tax reform study92 (Treasury 
proposals), advanced a number of proposals affecting transfer taxation. 
Thus far, only its proposal regarding repeal and replacement of the 1976 
GST system93 has been considered and acted upon. Among the Treasury's 
most significant proposals is that of computing gift tax liability on a "tax-
inclusive" basis,94 with the result that gift tax attributable to a transfer be 
treated as part of the transfer tax base. If implemented, one of the tax 
incentives for making lifetime gifts would be eliminated but many others 
would remain. A likely consequence of implementation would be a decline 
in immediate gift tax revenues and a deferred increase in estate tax collec-
tions. The proposal contributes modestly to fairness, but does little to reduce 
complexity or improve efficiency and increase neutrality. The proposal was 
examined and rejected by the American Bar Association's Task Force on 
Transfer Tax Restructuring (Task Force).95 
A second 1984 Treasury proposal, of which the Task Force generally 
approves, 96 is a revision of the rules governing completion, for transfer tax 
purposes, of lifetime gifts in trust where the transferor retains beneficial 
interests or powers affecting enjoyment by trust beneficiaries.97 Under the 
proposal, for example, gifts of property in which the donor retains an 
income interest would be regarded as incomplete, and would not be taxable 
until the termination of the income interest. No gift tax would be imposed 
at time of transfer with respect to the remainder interest. Also, gifts where 
the transferor retains no beneficial enjoyment would be considered complete 
notwithstanding a retained power to affect enjoyment by beneficiaries. The 
proposal, on its face, furthers the cause of simplification by reducing or 
eliminating the likelihood of a transfer in trust being subject to combined 
estate and gift tax reporting and compliance rules. However, in reality, it 
renders the law more complex in that the transition rules needed to protect 
pre-effective date trust arrangements will require, for another generation, 
knowledge and understanding of two sets of rather complex bodies of law 
on when gifts in trust are and are not complete for transfer tax purposes. 
The proposal does, however, contribute to fairness and may render GRITS, 
GRATS, and GRUTS98 obsolete for transfer tax minimization purposes. 
92. 2 TREAS. DEP'T, TAX REFORM FOR FAIRNESS, SIMPUCITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 
373-405 (1984} [hereinafter FAIRNEss, SIMPUCITY]. The proposals were not included in THE 
PRESIDENT'S TAX PROPOSALS TO THE CONGRESS FOR FAIRNESS, GROWTH AND SIMPLICITY {1985}, 
and except as noted in the text, have not been the subject of further legislation. 
93. FAIRNESS, SIMPUCITY, supra note 92, at 389-92. 
94. Id. at 377-78. 
95. A.B.A. Section of Taxation Task Force on Transfer Tax Restructuring, Report on 
Transfer Tax Restructuring, 41 TAX LAW. 393, 402-04 (1988} [hereinafter Task Force Report]. 
The report was prepared at the request of the Treasury Department for suggestions for 
simplification and improvement of the Federal transfer tax. The Report considered a number 
of the 1984 Treasury Proposals and also presented some additional recommendations. 
96. Id. at 404-10. 
97. FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, supra note 92, at 378-83. 
98. I.R.C. § 2702. 
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A third 1~84 Treasury proposal addresses valuation issues encountered 
when a shareholder whose shares may reflect a control "premium" transfers 
a partial interest in a corporation and the transferor attempts to value the 
transferred interest by applying a "minority" discount. 99 It seeks to eliminate 
the valuation "abuse" by requiring, in general, that the transferred interest 
be assigned "proportional" value from the block of stock owned prior to 
the transfer. The details of the proposal have not been set forth and its 
implementation is likely to require complex statutory language. While not 
flatly rejected, it received a generally hostile evaluation by the Task Force. 100 
Implementation of the proposal would make a modest contribution to 
fairness in preventing erosion of the transfer tax base. It is notable that the 
minority discount problem arises because our transfer tax system seeks to 
tax the value of the interest transferred, as opposed to the value of the 
interest received. Under the alternative models discussed in the next section-
those of employing an accessions tax or of including gifts and bequests in 
the recipient's income-the minority discount problem should not be present 
because the focus is on value received, not value transferred. 
Other 1984 Treasury proposals seek to tighten definitional rules relating 
to powers of appointment where the holder has a limited power of inva-
sion, 101 modify computations rules for certain credits, 102 deny an estate tax 
deduction for interest expense, 103 limit deferred payment of estate tax to 
situations in which there is an actual liquidity problem, 104 and repeal the 
opportunity for capital gain treatment for certain estate tax related stock 
redemptions. 105 These proposals are not discussed because they are compar-
atively unimportant to this essay. 
The Task Force, in its evaluation of some of the 1984 Treasury 
proposals, formulated additional proposals directed to the cause of reducing 
complexity and adding fairness. 106 One proposal calls for replacing the 
graduated rate schedule applicable after the exemption level is exceeded with 
a flat fifty-percent rate. 107 This is intended to advance simplicity by removing 
the challenge to enhance tax savings in planning for married couples which 
is present under a graduated rate structure. Implementation of the proposal, 
while serving the interests of simplicity, reduces the progressivity of the 
transfer tax scheme and would increase actual tax burdens for varying 
99. FAIRNESS, SIMPLICITY, supra note 92, at 386-88. 
100. Task Force Report, supra note 95, at 421-24. 
101. FAIRNEss, SIMPLICITY, supra note 92, at 384-85. The proposal would amend I.R.C. 
§ 2041 to generally treat a holder's power to invade as a taxable general power of appointment 
even where limited by standards. 
102. Id. at 393-94 and 402-03. The proposals would liberalize the credit under I.R.C. § 
2013 for tax on prior transfers for intra-generational dispositions and would simplify compu-
tation of the credit under I.R.C. § 2012 for state death taxes. 
103. Id. at 398-99. 
104. Id. at 395-97. 
105. Id. at 404-05. 
106. Task Force Report, supra note 95, passim. 
107. Id. at 397-98. 
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numbers of persons, depending upon revision of the exemption level. 
A second Task Force proposal calls for replacement of the unified 
credit exemption device, which amounts to an exemption of $600,000, with 
a straight forward exemption. 108 This advances the cause of simplicity 
because exemptions would be expressed in dollar amounts rather thim in 
credit equivalents. While administrable and more understandable, it is not 
likely to ease the tax computation process. 
A third Task Force proposal, advanced in the cause of fairness, calls 
for making the exemption portable between spouses. 109 For example, assum-
ing an allowable exemption of $600,000, if a spouse died with a taxable 
estate of $250,000, the surviving spouse would be given the benefit of the 
unused $350,000 exemption, and would thus be able to avoid tax on the 
first $950,000 of such survivor's taxable estate. This serves the cause of 
fairness by reducing the transfer tax penalty that accompanies failure to 
plan for full utilization of allowable exemptions. Implementation of the 
proposal would require, however, the filing of estate tax returns by spouses 
who do not have taxable estates in order to permit the computation of 
unused exemption amounts, and would invite valuations disputes on the 
death of the surviving spouse regarding the accuracy of valuations and 
deductions reflected on the nontaxable return of the predeceasing spouse. 
What is gained in the cause of fairness comes at a cost of greater complexity 
and increased compliance costs in the administration of the system. The 
fairness issue associated with a spouse's unused exemption simply does not 
arise under the accessions tax alternative discussed in the next section. 
A fourth Task Force proposal acknowledges the erosion in the tax base 
associated with lifetime giving techniques focused on the annual exclusion. 
This proposal calls for retaining the $10,000 per donee exclusion and for 
limiting exclusions to an aggregate yearly amount, suggested at $30,000, but 
doubled for a married couple. 110 The proposal advances the cause of fairness 
by reducing, but not eliminating, tax avoidance possible through the use of 
gift tax exclusions. An aspect of the proposal calls for replacing the easily 
avoided "present interest" requirement for exclusion with a "vested inter-
est" in the donee standard, a move toward simplicity that should reduce 
use of the "Crummey" demand power technique. 
A fifth Task Force proposal would tighten the estate tax inclusion rule 
applicable to employment related post-death benefit payments by eliminating 
the current requirement for inclusion that the decedent must have possessed 
a right to receive an annuity or other payment.111 This also serves the 
interests of faitness by treating all employment generated post-death pay-
ments equally. . 
If the present transfer tax system is to be retained, the proposals 
discussed above deserve serious consideration. A number serve to reduce 
108. Id. at 398. 
109. /d. at 398-400. 
110. /d. at 401-02. 
Ill. /d. at 411-12. 
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tax avoidance opportunities and contribute to the fairness and integrity of 
the system and move the system toward a more coherent scheme for unified 
treatment of lifetime and testamentary dispositive arrangements. However, 
some come at the cost of greater complexity, greater inefficiency, and 
increased compliance costs. None are likely to reduce materially the human 
and resource costs imposed by the present system. The effects of the 
proposals on revenue have not been authoritatively projected, in part because 
many of the details have not been worked out. It is unlikely however, that 
increased revenues would be at a level that would adequately offset the 
huge inefficiency costs that have been described in the preceding section. 
Even if each of the proposals were implemented, a strong case would remain 
for repeal of the existing transfer tax structure. 
An important observation regarding major proposals discussed above is 
in order. Each of them responds, in some way, to a circumstance associated 
with the transferor. They involve (1) the gift tax base (tax inclusive or 
exclusive) of the donor, (2) effect on completeness of gifts when the donor 
retains interests and powers, (3) value of transferred stock from the per-
spective of the donor's control "premium," (4) the- transferor's transfer tax 
rate structure, (5) the decedent's unused unified credit or exemption amount, 
(6) the number and amount of gifts made by the donor, and (7) possession 
or non-possession by the decedent of rights with respect to employment 
related post-death benefits. 
Under the existing transfer tax structure the entire emphasis is on the 
transferor, value in the hands of the transferor, actions taken by the 
transferor, rights possessed or retained by the transferor, and other circum-
stances· of the transferor. The transfer tax system's deficiencies in terms of 
fairness, efficiency and neutrality are largely explainable by its emphasis on 
the circumstances of the transferor. That emphasis invites the use of 
minimization and avoidance techniques and penalizes failure to use such 
methods. The entire estate planning industry, in service of the cause of 
avoiding and minimizing transfer taxes, focuses on the circumstances and 
actions of the transferor. It exploits opportunities within the system to alter 
and modify the actions and circumstances of the transferor. The huge 
compliance and avoidance costs in money and resources generated by the 
transfer tax system derive in large measure from its focus on the acts and 
circumstances of the transferor. 
If wealth transfers are to be taxed under the federal revenue system, 
models of taxation which have a focus on the circumstances of the transferee 
rather than on those of the transferor may permit transfer taxation in ways 
that are fairer, more efficient, and more neutral. Estate planners can readily 
and effectively exploit a system which focuses on the transferor. A system 
focused on the circumstances of the transferee is inherently less subject to 
manipulation and avoidance than one focused on the transferor. Transferees 
are less apt to arrange their financial position with respect to hoped for 
receipt of wealth from others not under their control, but transferors, 
because they must face certain disposition of wealth which they do control, 
are tempted to manipulate asset arrangements and dispositive schemes. Two 
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models for taxing gratuitous transfers have been developed by thoughtful 
commentators, one employing an accessions tax, the other employing inclu-
sion of gifts and bequests in the income tax base. They are discussed in the 
next section. 
v. 'TRANSFEREE CENTERED MODELS FOR WEALTH TAXATION 
A. The Accession Tax Model 
An accessions tax, like the current estate and gift taxes, is an excise tax 
on gratuitous transfers, but is imposed on the recipient rather than on the 
transferor. Being imposed on the transferee, the accessions tax is similar to 
the inheritance taxes in general use in other industrialized countries112 and 
to the state inheritance taxes once prevalent here. Unlike most inheritance 
tax systems, however, the accessions tax is cumulative. Each taxable acces-
sion by a transferee, whether from one or several sources, causes a further 
climb up the rate table. An accessions tax to replace the estate and gift tax 
system was first proposed in 1945 by Professor Rudick. 113 His proposal was 
developed further by Professor Andrews in connection with his work as 
Reporter for American Law Institute Project on Federal Estate and Gift 
Taxation, completed in 1968.114 Professor Halbach, focussing heavily on 
achieving neutrality in a transfer tax system, has recently refined the 
accessions tax model.m Under his version of the model, the accessions tax 
is entirely centered on the circumstances of the transferee. The transferee 
would enjoy a modest annual exclusion for direct accessions, but none for 
accessions from trusts. 116 In addition, the transferee would enjoy a substan-
tial exemption under the rate structure, and potentially taxable accessions 
from different sources would collectively absorb the exemption, and addi-
tional accessions would thereafter be subject to accessions tax.117 The ac-
cessions tax could either be graduated or imposed at a flat rate. However, 
a flat rate would simplify needed provisions that might otherwise be highly 
complex. 118 Generally, an accession would occur only upon the receipt of 
money or property, and thus would not occur merely upon the creation of 
a nonpossessory interest. 119 Halbach's version anticipates that a donor or 
testator may be tempted to multiply exclusions and exemptions by making 
112. Aaron & Munnell, supra note 36, at 133. 
113. Harry J. Rudick, A Proposal for an Accessions Tax, I Tax L. Rev. 25 (1945). 
114. William D. Andrews, Reporter's Study of the Accessions Tax Proposal, in AMERICAN 
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL EsTATE AND GIFT TAXATION 446 (1969). For further discussion, see 
William D. Andrews, The Accessions Tax Proposal, 22 TAX L. REv. 589 (1967). 
115. Edward C. Halbach, Jr., An Accessions Tax, 23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 211 
(1988). 
116. Jd. at 235. 
117. Jd. at 229·35. 
118. Jd. at 247. 
119. Jd. at 222. 
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transfers to a child and to the spouse of the child, and suggests that a 
proper solution would lie in attributing to a person any transfer made by 
the person's close relatives to the person's spouse.120 
A "deferral problem" inheres in any transfer tax imposed on a trans-
feree at time of possession, rather than upon creation of the interest. Such 
a tax system invites postponed payment of tax by using trust arrangements 
to defer distributions. That invitation violates neutrality considerations in 
favoring dispositive arrangements that would not otherwise have been used 
and also defers the receipt of revenue which might have been earlier collected 
had the disposition been outright rather than in trust. Halbach anticipates 
the problem and suggests a solution in the form of advance payment of 
"estimated" tax under certain trust arrangements. 121 He also anticipates 
problems involving use of beneficiary exemptions where interests are held 
in trust and suggests elective solutions under which the government and the 
beneficiary can be considered co-beneficiaries during the continuation of 
the trust arrangement. 122 To this writer, Halbach's solutions, while admit-
tedly requiring complex statutory language, seem fair, effective, and admin-
istrable. 
Another problem inhering in an accessions tax.---model is that of "gen-
eration-skipping.'' In the normal order of things one may assume that most 
wealth at the death of parents would be left to children. An accessions tax 
invites "scattering" among transferees within the family to take advantage 
of additional transferee exclusions, and particularly invites transfers to 
grandchildren, which, in bypassing children, avoid the imposition of taxes 
that might otherwise have occurred on the death of children. The generation-
skipping problem exists under the current system and is the subject of a 
separate generation-skipping tax. To the extent that generation-skipping is 
encouraged under any transfer tax system, neutrality is violated. Halbach 
confronts the generation-skipping problem with a suggestion for a two-step 
computation of tax liability on transfers to grandchildren, whether outright, 
or deferred through trust arrangements.123 Because of the focus on the 
transferee, rather than on the circumstances and exemptions of the trans-
feror, his approach, while complex, seems less so than the current genera-
tion-skipping tax. His approach also seems fair and administrable, and 
serves well the goal of neutrality. 
The accessions tax model as refined by Professor Halbach, being 
centered on the circumstances of the transferee rather than those of the 
transferor, offers a number of advantages when contrasted with the present 
transfer tax system under the policy measures of fairness, efficiency, and 
neutrality. 
120. /d. at 224. 
121. /d. at 248-70. 
122. /d. at 248-61. 
123. /d. at '240-47. 
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The accessions tax, centered and imposed on transferees, is inherently 
fairer than the existing tax system in that persons whose total gift and 
bequest receipts are comparable are comparably taxed. 124 Because under any 
transfer tax system the tax costs are ultimately borne by successors to the 
transferred wealth, horizontal and vertical equity is best measured in terms 
of impact on the recipient successors. Under the accessions tax, they are 
treated equally. Also, being focussed on the transferees, there are no fairness 
issues arising from aggressive use of, or failure to use, exemptions of the 
transferor, in that there are no such exemptions. No one is penalized, for 
example, for failure to use a by-pass trust or other device oriented toward 
the existing unified credit. 125 Because of its focus on the accession to property 
rather than the creation of an interest in property, issues of whether a 
transfer is complete or whether the transferor has retained impermissible 
powers or interests simply do not arise. 126 The complex questions of com-
pleteness or incompleteness of transfers addressed in the regulations under 
Code section 2511 and under Code sections 2036, 2037, and 2702 can be 
ignored under an accessions tax.'27 Similarly, valuation issues involving 
transfers of partial interests in trust to spouses or to charity largely disap-
pear. Accessions by spouses and by charities would remain exempt from 
transfer taxation. However no "terminable interest" rule is necessary and 
complex rules currently applicable to term and remainder interests given to 
charity are also unnecessary because of the inherent structure of an acces-
sions tax.128 Questions of tax liability and exemption are presented and 
resolved at time of possession, not at time of creation of the particular 
interest. Issues relating to the amount of exclusions or amount of exemptions 
do not arise until an interest becomes possessory by outright transfer or 
distribution from a trust, and valuation is relatively easy at such time. 129 
The "premium" under the present system associated with equalizing the 
estates of husband and wife, and the attendant penalty for failure to do so 
disappears under the accessions tax model. 130 When a child receives acces-
sions of $2,000,000 upon the combined deaths of both parents, it largely 
matters not whether the bulk of the accession comes from the first or 
second parent to die. The applicable rate table is not that of the transferor, 
but that of the transferee. The combined accessions of a particular individual 
are essentially taxed as if there is only one accession. 
124. Id. at 213. 
125. Id. at 224. 
126. !d. at 221-22. 
127. Treas. Reg. §§ 25.2511-2 (as amended in 1983) (dealing with cessation of donor's 
dominion and control); 20.2036-1 (as amended in 1960) (dealing with transfers with retained 
life estates); 20.2037-1 (1958) (dealing with transfers taking effect at death); 25.2702-0 to -7 
(1992) (dealing with transfers of interests in trusts). 
128. Halbach, supra note 115, at 221-22. 
129. !d. 
130. Id. at 223. 
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In addition to its inherent capacity for greater fairness and neutrality 
than under the present system, the accessions tax model offers the potential 
for simpler compliance procedures and mechanisms. The administration of 
the accessions tax can be coordinated with the current income tax system.131 
Additional reporting would be required, but this can be accomplished 
through the device of appropriate schedules or supplements to the annual 
Form 1040. Under the model, transferees are responsible for the reporting 
of accessions and the payment of any tax due after use of minimum annual 
exclusions and exhaustion of exemptions. 132 
Because transferees have the reporting and payment duties, and because 
the tax is measured by the value of accessions when they are paid or become 
possessory, not by the circumstances and prior behavior and dispositions 
of the transferor, personal representatives may be relieved of personal 
liability for payment of transfer tax under the accessions tax model. This 
feature facilitates use by states of simplified probate practices permitting 
succession without administration, practices common in European countries 
that employ transferee centered inheritance taxes in lieu of transferor 
centered estate taxes. 133 
B. Income Tax Model 
Currently gifts and bequests are excluded from income under the income 
tax.134 Consequently, wealth transfers that are not subject to estate, gift, 
and generation-skipping tax are not part of the federal tax base. A number 
of commentators have suggested that inclusion of gifts and bequests in 
taxable income is theoretically sound under an income tax based upon ability 
to pay .135 A widely accepted economists' model of the proper income tax 
base assumes that income consists of accessions to wealth between two 
points in time, including donative receipts. 136 Canada, in connection with 
repeal of its estate and gift tax system, considered, but did not implement, 
a detailed proposal for including gifts and bequests in the income of 
recipients. 137 The Canadian proposal has generated ongoing interest in this 
country in including donative receipts in the recipient's taxable income as 
an alternative to continuation of our current estate and gift tax system.138 
The proposal to include donative receipts in income as an alternative 
to the present system of taxing donative transfers has much to commend 
131. Id. at 229. 
132. Jd. 
133. Id. 
134. I.R.C. § 102 (1988). 
135. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts 
and Bequests in Income, 91 HAR.v. L. REv. 1177 (1978) (arguing fairness and simplicity 
mandate income inclusion in lieu of transfer tax system); Hudson, supra note 3, at 59; Munnell, 
supra note 28; Gac & Brougham, supra note 82. 
136. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1182-84 (discussing "Haig-Simons" comprehensive tax 
base model). See also 'fREAs. DEP'T, BLUEPRINTS FOR BASIC TAX REFORM 1-3 (1977). 
137. Munnell, supra note 28, at 21-22. 
138. See supra note 135 (citing sources). 
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it. First, it would further refine the income tax in employing a more 
comprehensive base geared to taxpayer ability to pay. Second, its adminis-
tration would be comparatively simple in relation to compliance structures 
currently used in enforcing the existing transferor based transfer tax system. 
Third, being transferee oriented rather than transferor oriented, it shares 
with the accessions tax the structural features that better serve the goals of 
fairness and neutrality. Fourth, because the proposal would utilize only 
minimal exclusions139 and would generate revenues based on the income tax 
. posture of the recipient transferee, it has the capacity to generate greater 
revenues than are derived from the existing transfer tax system. 
This last advantage carries with it the political difficulty that a consid-
erably larger number of persons would be burdened by the imposition of 
taxes measured by donative transfers. Attempts to reduce the political 
difficulty by the device of using generous exclusions would be a conscious 
departure from the ability to pay principle. No doubt the life insurance 
industry would vigorously oppose any attempt to treat life insurance pro-
ceeds as includible in the income of beneficiaries. Whether the model of 
including donative receipts in taxable income should be implemented is 
fundamentally a political question involving notions of the proper structure 
of the income tax. It is generally acknowledged that the current income tax 
system taxes earned income more heavily than income from capital. 140 A 
substantial amount of gains from capital escapes taxation because of the 
step-up in basis accorded appreciated assets at the death of the owner .141 If 
accumulated capital were taxed as income to the recipient upon donative 
transfer, much of the perceived abuse in the under-taxation of income from 
capital would be effectively addressed. Sound income tax policy considera-
tions strongly suggested that the income tax base be expanded to include 
donative receipts. A major collateral advantage is that implementation of 
such expansion of the income tax base permits repeal of the estate and gift 
tax system without revenue loss, and with the potential for significant 
revenue gain. The proposal to include donative receipts in income deserves 
sympathetic consideration by Congress. 
C. Problems in the Income Tax Proposal 
A major problem inherent in the income tax proposal involves the 
proper treatment of transfers in trust, and the potential for using trust 
arrangements to postpone distributions and imposition of tax. An approach 
suggested by Professor Dodge carries with it the advantage of relative 
simplicity. Under this approach, the current conduit system under Subchap-
ter "J" of the Internal Revenue Code for apportioning income between a 
trust or estate and its beneficiaries would be repealed, and all distributions, 
no distinctions being made between distributions of current income, accu-
139. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1192. 
140. Graetz, supra note 13, at 273. 
141. Jd. 
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mulated income, and corpus, would be taxed as income to the recipient. 142 
If deferral by postponement of distributions is considered abusive, a with-
holding tax could be imposed on the trustees of large trusts, which could 
be credited against liability by distributees when distributions occur and 
become taxable. 143 Except for such withholding tax liability in certain cases, 
trusts would be exempt from tax. Under this approach trusts would have a 
zero basis for assets held in kind, and thus there would be no depreciation 
problem with respect to depreciable assets held in trust. 144 Depreciable 
property would not acquire a basis for allowance of depreciation until 
distributions occur. 
Another approach to the problem posed by use of trusts suggested by 
commentators is to retain the present structure of Subchapter "J," and to 
treat trusts as taxpayers. A trust would include initial funding transfers in 
income and thus pay income tax, 145 presumably at the highest income tax 
bracket in the case of sizable funding transfers. Concededly, under this 
proposal, some unfairness could result if the beneficiary who is the equitable 
owner of the assets held in trust is in a lower bracket. The extent of the 
fairness problem is in large measure a function of the bracket spread used 
in the income tax structure. In a regime of few brackets, tightly compacted, 
the problem is less severe. A possible solution is to permit, in certain cases, 
the beneficiary to elect to have the corpus, on receipt in trust, to be directly 
taxed to the beneficiary .146 Any exclusions that would have been accorded 
the beneficiary had the beneficiary been a direct transferee could thus be 
used. Depending upon the extent of bracket spread, income averaging 
methods could be employed to deal with "bunching" of large amounts 
within a year .147 
Liquidity may be a problem if income tax is due upon donative receipt 
in-kind of nonmarketable or difficult to market assets. Suggestions to deal 
with liquidity problems include authorization for deferred payment of tax 
in installments148 or the assigning of a zero basis to such assets as real estate 
and closely held business interests. 149 
Another problem of including donative receipts in income is that of 
distinguishing between transfers pursuant to obligations to support depend-
ents, which presumably should not be taxed, and truly donative payments 
which should be taxed. 150 However, this problem is not novel to the proposal 
to include donative receipts in income and arises as well under the current 
estate and gift tax system, where payments made pursuant to support 
obligations are not within the transfer tax base. Transfers which enable 
142. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1180-81. 
143. Id. at 1197. 
144. Id. at 1195. 
145. Gac & Brougham, supra note 82, at 95. 
146. Id. 
147. Id. at 92. 
148. Id. at 99. 
149. Dodge, supra note 135, at 1199-1200.· 
150. Id. at 1202-08. 
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current consumption by dependents should pose no insurmountable prob-
lems, nor should those for payment of medical expenses and tuition costs. 
Transfers of securities and cash which serve to "endow" the transferee 
would be included in the tax base to the extent in excess of prescribed 
exclusion amounts. 
Generation-skipping, as such, does not present a direct potential for 
abuse under the proposal to include gifts and bequests in the income tax 
base, at least in terms of the underlying policy of taxing individuals under 
the income tax by reference to ability to pay. However, in the normal order 
of things, accumulated wealth owned free of trust would be transferred at 
least once each generation, and would thus be included in the enlarged 
income tax base at least that frequently. Use of trusts benefitting multiple 
generations thus would result in a potential loss of revenue if accumulated 
wealth is not taxed at each generation within the income tax base. Whether 
estate planners would advise, and clients concur in, use of multiple-gener-
ation trusts to minimize income tax is unclear, and may be a function of 
the income tax rate structure. Such an income tax minimizing strategy is 
implemented at the cost of postponing the receipt and enjoyment of wealth 
(trust distributions) by the beneficiaries who are the objects of bounty. If, 
however, use of multi-generational trusts is encouraged under the proposal 
to include gifts and bequests in income, the goal of neutrality is to that 
extent undermined. Some sort of generation-skipping levy, such as imposing 
income tax on trusts with respect to corpus and accumulated income at 
periodic intervals, perhaps every thirty or thirty-five years, may prove to 
be needed. 151 
Any consideration of expanding the income tax base by including 
donative receipts in the income of recipients is likely to be politically 
controversial. Congress would face difficult choices with respect to the 
treatment of items such as life insurance proceeds and wrongful death tort 
recoveries paid to survivors and in establishing exclusion amounts. To 
achieve neutrality and fairness, careful attention must be paid to problems 
presented by trust arrangements and to the deferral issues posed by trusts. 
Whether the political constraints to implementing a fair scheme of including 
donative receipts in income are surmountable is unclear. However, the 
technical problems involved in achieving fairness and neutrality appear 
solvable, although the solutions may require a degree of complexity. In the 
ongoing process of attempting to improve the income tax, the proposal to 
include donative receipts in the income tax base deserves careful and 
sympathetic consideration. In addition to an improved income tax, such 
consideration could facilitate abolition of the current estate, gift, and 
generation-skipping taxes. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The current system of transfer taxation should be abolished. In taxing 
transferors rather than transferees in donative transactions the structure of 
151. Gac & Brougham, supra note 82, at 96-97. 
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the present scheme is fundamentally flawed. The current transfer tax system 
does not achieve its perceived goals and produ~es revenues that are grossly 
inadequate in relation to its unfairness, inefficiency, and lack of neutrality. 
These revenues are insufficient to compensate for the costs and burdens 
imposed by the system. Proposed reforms and refinements of the present 
system, if implemented, are unlikely to make burdens and costs of the 
system tolerable. Reasonable people differ as to whether wealth transfers 
should be subject to taxation. If such transfers are properly subject to tax 
and if such tax should be borne only by the wealthiest segment of the 
population, Congress should replace the present system with a transferee-
based accessions tax with appropriate exclusions and exemptions. The ac-
cession tax model offers a structure that is inherently fairer, more efficient, 
and more neutral than the current system. As an alternative, although 
politically more difficult to implement, Congress should give careful con-
sideration to the proposal to make the income tax base more comprehensive 
by including donative transfers within the transferee's gross income. Under 
either alternative, Congress would rid the Internal Revenue Code of the 
current outdated and overly complex system while enhancing the realization 
of the policy goals for the future of transfer taxation 
